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AbstrAct
this article brings to the attention of those public servants involved in the design and 
negotiation of free trade agreements between the United states and developing countries, 
such as colombia, the potential benefits and drawbacks of negotiating in a bilateral forum. 
rather than critiquing the free trade agreement for its particular provisions, this article 
examines the u.s. policy of negotiating bilaterally with developing countries as opposed 
to multilaterally in the world trade system and what effects such an approach might have 
on the economic development of the latter. Using an incremental policy analysis, the 
article critiques the bilateral approach in terms of economic development and fair trade 
negotiations using the recent colombia-u.s. trade agreement as a case study. the article 
concludes that a bilateral approach that is disconnected from a broader multilateral con-
text may be detrimental to developing countries and recommends increased oversight of 
such agreements by the World trade Organization to ensure a higher degree of fairness.
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AcUErDOs bILAtErALEs Y PráctIcAs JUstAs DE IntErcAMbIO  
DE cOMErcIO: Un AnáLIsIs AL trAtADO DE LIbrE cOMErcIO  
DE cOLOMbIA Y EstADOs UnIDOs (2006)
rEsUMEn
Este artículo pretende ilustrar a aquellos servidores públicos que están involucrados en el 
diseño y en la negociación de tratados de libre comercio entre Estados Unidos y países 
en desarrollo, como es el caso de colombia, acerca de los posibles beneficios e incon-
venientes de negociar en un foro bilateral. Aquí no se busca criticar ningún tratado, sino 
examinar la política estadounidense de negociar bilateralmente con países en desarrollo 
versus multilateralmente en un sistema de intercambio mundial, y los efectos que pueden 
traer estas circunstancias en el desarrollo económico. Motivo por el cual el autor critica la 
utilización de tratados bilaterales, caso reciente entre colombia y Estados Unidos, por los 
efectos que este tiene en el desarrollo económico del país más débil y por la poca igualdad 
y justicia que existen en el momento de negociar el intercambio de bienes y servicios. 
concluye el autor que el escenario bilateral completamente desconectado de un mucho 
más amplio contexto multilateral puede ir en detrimento para el desarrollo de los países y 
recomienda mayor vigilancia sobre estos tratados por parte de la oMc (Organización Mun-
dial del comercio/World trade Organization) para asegurar un mayor grado de justicia.
Palabras clave: tratado de Libre comercio; Desarrollo económico; Intercambio; bilat-
eral; Multilateral.
I. IntrODUctIOn
After two years of negotiations and attempts to secure a workable agreement, colombia 
and the United states signed a bilateral trade agreement on February 27, 2006. this 
was a momentous occasion for both countries as colombia is the third largest Latin 
American economy and it plays a significant role in u.s. foreign policy. the agreement 
solidifies many of the trading practices that were in place since 1991 under the Andean 
trade Preferences Act (atPa), which was set to expire in December of 2006, making the 
timing of this agreement ideal.
In part, the agreement represents a failure on the part of the bush Administration 
to secure a Free trade Area of the Americas, which had been under negotiation since 
19983. Instead, the u.s. chose to negotiate bilateral agreements with the four Andean 
countries, colombia, bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, crafting unique arrangements for the 
specific demands and economic resources of each individual country.
3 see, e.g., Mario e. cararnza, Latin American Perspective: mercosur, The Free Trade Area of the Americas, and the 
Future of U.S. Hegemony in Latin America, 27 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1029, 1030 (Feb. 2004).
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Although the agreement with colombia has not yet been made law, as it must first 
be ratified by the u.s. congress, its supporters offer unquestionable approval of the final 
terms and it is likely to be codified soon. alvaro uribe, President of colombia, said, “this 
deal isn’t about winners and losers. there are just winners”4. u.s. trade representative 
robert Portman said of the deal, “[t]he agreement will help foster economic develop-
ment in colombia and contribute to efforts to counter narco-terrorism, which threatens 
democracy and regional stability”5. Economists, industry leaders and politicians alike 
have expressed positive analyses of this arrangement.
the agreement is beneficial for u.s. businesses that work with Latin America or that 
intend to in the future6. but is this the best arrangement for colombia? Will this agree-
ment bring economic growth to the colombian economy, and will that growth reach the 
impoverished majority? this paper will explore the use of bilateral trade agreements as a 
general public policy, seen through the eyes of both the dominant and the subordinate 
parties to the agreement. It will then explore the colombian market and distinctions 
from a traditional market that may play a role in the establishment and successful op-
eration of a free trade agreement. subsequently, using an incrementalist policy analysis, 
the u.s.-colombia Free trade Agreement will be explored in context by highlighting 
the potential benefits and drawbacks of the arrangement. Finally, conclusions and rec-
ommendations will be drawn to guide policymakers on the negotiation of other such 
arrangements in the future.
II. tHE UsE OF bILAtErAL trADE AgrEEMEnts As PUbLIc POLIcY
trade policy is one of the key components of any effective foreign policy. the establish-
ment of beneficial trade relationships can facilitate domestic growth and industry expan-
sion, while simultaneously promoting the development of an efficient global marketplace. 
bilateral free trade agreements offer each country a set of particular benefits that will, 
in theory, increase their position as an exporter to the other party, among other things. 
these benefits generally include reduced tariffs and quotas on key products exported 
to the other country, which allow exporters to reduce overall costs.
the u.s. has the largest economy in the world, in terms of gross domestic product 
(gdP). Accordingly, it has the greatest economic influence and impact on other countries 
when negotiating trade agreements. the strong voices of the u.s. business community 
and industries such as agriculture and sugar have a substantial impact on the positions 
taken by the u.s. trade representative (ustr)7.
4 see us, Colombia reach free trade deal, wasH. Post, Feb. 27, 2006.
5 Id. 
6 see also carranza at 1032 (referring to the ftaa and suggesting that u.s. government and big business 
interests will have a unique opportunity to pry open the Mercosur market).
7 see, e.g., stePHanie saul, Drug Lobby Got a Victory in Trade Pact Vote. n.Y. times, July 2, 2005 (discussing 
the successful lobbying efforts of u.s. drug companies during the negotiations for the central American 
Free trade Agreement); see also, chantal thomas, For Democracy and Trade: The Case of the United States, 41 
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the ustr has marketed free trade as a cure to the severe problems of poverty in many 
developing countries in which they are negotiating agreements8. the logic behind this 
idea comes from the widely held belief that economic growth spurs poverty reduction, 
and that free trade agreements bring economic growth9. However, several prominent 
scholars have concluded quite the opposite. Free trade may bring growth to certain 
sectors, but in the majority of cases, the developing country experiences a reduction in 
economic growth and an expansion of poverty10.
the exceedingly slow process of multilateral trade negotiations, such as that of the 
World trade Organization, encourages developed countries such as the u.s. to meet its 
demand for better terms of trade through the use of smaller, less complicated bilateral 
and regional trade agreements. these agreements promise short-term gains in both trade 
access and political capital.
Powerful negotiators such as the u.s. have a vested interest in seeing economic 
growth and poverty reduction in developing countries because this creates more secure 
investment environments and increases the productivity of the world economy. How-
ever, if the policy of free trade and ftas is failing to achieve these goals, it may be more 
appropriate to re-evaluate the policy and attempt to identify more effective mechanisms 
for achieving these goals. thus, the next step in determining the effectiveness of ftas as 
a public policy is to consider their impact on a developing economy.
III. trADE POLIcY In tHE WEstErn HEMIsPHErE
Brief Trade History of Latin America
Latin American trade policies throughout the 1970s relied largely upon import substitu-
tion and infant industry protection, which involved significant state assistance for new 
industries and the promotion of industries which do not necessarily have a comparative 
advantage in trade11. the theory behind import substitution is that by limiting foreign 
imports of manufactured goods and replacing them with domestically produced goods, 
exports will begin to exceed imports and economic growth will occur12.
Harvard L. rev. 1, 12.(describing the strong influence of industries in lobbying for benefits under u.s. 
trade policy).
8 see Press release, United states trade representative (ustr), Myth: trade and the ftaa will spread 
Poverty, Fact sheet (nov. 2003), available at www.ustr.gov (contending that free trade is “among the 
most powerful tools available to fight poverty”.) [hereinafter “trade Facts”]. 
9 iMf Working Paper, M. ayHan kose, guy M. MereditH, cHristoPHer M. towe, How Has nafta Affected 
the Mexican Economy? Review and Evidence, April 2004, at 24-25.
10 see, e.g., Id. at 25.
11 see, e.g., josePH stiglitz and andrew cHarlton, Fair Trade for All: How Can Trade Promote Development 
17-21 (Oxford University Press 2005).
12 see, e.g., werner baer, Import Substitution and Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences and Interpretations, 
7 Latin Am. res. rev. n.º 1, 95 (1972).
81Bilateral Agreements and Fair Trade Practices: A Policy Analysis of the Colombia-U.S.
d
e
r
e
c
h
o
 e
c
o
n
ó
m
ic
o
 
in
t
e
r
n
a
c
io
n
a
l
con-texto • revista de derecho y economía • n.º 42 • julio-diciembre 2014 • pp. 77-96
Many countries in Latin America believed that adhering to the traditional theory of 
comparative advantage would require reliance on certain advantageous commodity exports 
that were not growing as quickly as other commodities in which they did not possess these 
same advantages13. resulting growth in the region during the 1970s confirmed the wisdom 
of these policies; however, growth fell to nearly zero in the 1980s while Asian countries, 
which relied on a theory of export promotion rather than import substitution, grew rap-
idly14. During this period, per capita income in Latin America declined by ten percent15.
some researchers argue that the reason for the Latin American economic stagnation 
during the 1980s was the failed policy of import substitution. However, Joseph stiglitz 
argues that this is not likely the case because, despite different trade policies in each 
country, economic stagnation occurred across the region16. rather, stiglitz suggests that 
it was the openness of the Latin American economy to Foreign Direct Investment (fdi) 
and reliance on foreign capital goods that led to an increased debt burden and a result-
ing economic shock17. the protectionist policies of East Asia along with their export 
promotion were part of the reason that the region grew so rapidly18. this dependence 
on foreign capital combined with domestic markets, unprotected from foreign imports, 
resulted in stagnant, if not negative growth in Latin America.
colombia maintained an import substitution policy since the late 1950s. Only in 
1991 did colombia begin to reduce its trade barriers and engage in regional trade agree-
ments19. these agreements had been developing throughout south America since around 
1980, when countries began to abandon trade protectionist policies and began to open 
their economies20. In 1993, the Andean community was formed. this fta was made 
up of colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and bolivia and maintained a 2005 population of 
roughly 118 million people with a gdP of $650 billion21. several of the remaining south 
American countries, including brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, joined earlier 
to form Mercosur in 1991[22]. As the third largest trading bloc in the world23, and with 
235 million people and $2.05 trillion in gdP, Mercosur is a powerful force in shaping 
relations between Latin America and the rest of the world24.
13 see stiglitz at 19.
14 see Id. at 19-20.
15 see Peter HakiM, Western Hemisphere Free Trade: Why Latin America Should Be Interested, 526 Annals of the Am. 
Acad. of Pol. and soc. sci. 121, 123 (Mar. 1993).
16 stiglitz at 22.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 see diego agudelo, galia j. benitez and larry davidson, Regional and Global Integration in South Ameri-
ca: A Spanish Fiesta Within Trade Communities, Indiana Univ. center for International business Education & 
research, 7 (July 2005).
20 see Id. at 2, 4.
21 Id. at 7.
22 see Id. at 7 (noting that bolivia and chile are also associate members of Mercosur).
23 see Id. at 7-8.
24 note that Venezuela has recently notified the Andean community of its intended withdrawal from the 
group. see, e.g., Venezuela’s Withdrawal from can Prompts Worries, Latinnews Daily, April 21, 2006, at 1; but, 
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ftaa Negotiations
the Free trade Area of the Americas (ftaa) was first negotiated in 1998 at the second 
summit of the Americas in santiago, chile. the intent of the agreement initially was 
to expand the north American Free trade Agreement (nafta) throughout the Western 
Hemisphere by making a broader free trade zone25. this zone would encompass ap-
proximately 800 million people26. However, the Washington consensus27 – a term used 
to describe the export of free trade policies and liberal reform from the u.s. – had been 
broadly opposed throughout Latin America, making the negotiation of a regional trade 
agreement challenging28. According to Dr. Mario carranza, “[m]ost people in the 
region feel that two decades of neoliberal policies have done little to alleviate poverty 
in Latin America”29.
because of the economic and political power of Mercosur, issues of concern to the 
group must be addressed in any multilateral trade talks. two primary issues were raised 
by brazil at the ftaa talks – the singapore issues and u.s. agricultural subsidies. the 
“singapore issues” comprise a group of four issues of concern to developed countries but 
of little value and potential detrimental effect to developing countries. these issues are 
investment, competition, transparency, and government procurement. the proposed 
rules on foreign investment and competition policy could potentially prevent develop-
ing countries from importing technology and may give u.s. and European multinational 
businesses substantially more status in developing countries than a domestic business30. 
named for their negotiation at the World trade Organization (wto) singapore ministe-
rial meeting in 1998, this set of issues largely led to the breakdown of the 2003 cancun 
meeting of the wto31.
the more substantial sticking point for continued trade negotiations involves the 
demand for the U.s. to eliminate its agricultural subsidies, which provide roughly $20 bil-
lion in direct assistance32 to a farming sector comprising roughly 1% of the u.s. economy 
(see table 1)33. brazil demanded that the u.s. reduce agricultural subsidies as a condition 
of the ftaa, and the u.s. refused, stating instead that it would negotiate these subsidies 
see Chavez Says Venezuela Willing to Reconsider Exit From can, bbc Monitoring International reports, April 
24, 2006.
25 see carranza at 1030.
26 see agudelo at 9.
27 this term, originally coined by joHn williaMson, is also called neoliberalism and often refers to the 
process of globalization.
28 see carranza at 1047-48 (discussing the backlash resulting from the implementation of the Washington 
consensus throughout the 1990s).
29 carranza at 1049.
30 see carranza at 1051-52.
31 see World Trade Talks Collapse, bbc news, sept. 15, 2003.
32 see, e.g., cHris edwards and tad deHaven, The Stubborn Seeds of U.S. Farm Subsidies, the cato Institute 
(Aug. 2001).
33 see, e.g., Economist Intelligence Unit Country Commerce Report: United states (May 2005).
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as part of the Doha round of world trade negotiations34. the failure of the parties to 
reach agreement on these two issues largely led to the breakdown of the negotiations35.
tAbLE 1: PErcEntAgE OF OVErALL EcOnOMY In AgrIcULtUrE: UnItED stAtEs,  
cOLOMbIA AnD brAzIL
United states colombia
The economy at a glance
% of estimated 2004 gdP
Fiscal year: October 1st- september 30th.
source: Economic Intelligence Unit, Country
Forecast United states, April 2005.
services 79.0 Agriculture 1.0
Industry 20.0
The economy at a glance
% of 2004 gdP
Fiscal year: January 1st- December 31st.
source: Economic Intelligence Unit, Country
Forecast colombia, December 2005.
services 53.7 Agriculture 12.5
Industry 33.8
brazil
The economy at a glance
% of 2004 gdP
Fiscal year: January 1st- December 31th.
source: Economic Intelligence Unit, Country
Forecast brazil, June2005.
services 51.0 Agriculture 10.1
Industry 38.9
Data from the Economist Intelligence Unit (2005).
the wto Doha ministerial meeting was held in november 2001 and set an aggressive 
agenda focused on development issues as they relate to trade36. this meeting established 
34 see, e.g., carranza at 1051.
35 see carranza at 1052-53.
36 the Doha round was the fourth official high-level ministerial meeting since the 1995 establishment of 
the World trade Organization. the most recent ministerial meeting was held in Hong Kong in 2005. 
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working groups and an agenda for all member states to address at future ministerial mee-
tings, which are held at least every two years. the u.s. intended to address subsidies in 
the context of this agenda rather than in a regional trade negotiation because they sought 
equivalent subsidy reductions from the European Union, which would only happen in 
the context of multilateral trade negotiations37. However, there was industry-support 
for addressing the subsidies issue as part of the ftaa negotiations and economic surveys 
appeared to show an overall beneficial result to u.s. agriculture upon the elimination of 
subsidies in the ftaa region38.
there was strong support for the ftaa in many parts of Latin America, including 
those countries that objected to certain provisions regarding subsides and the singapore 
issues. For instance, the brazilian Ambassador to the u.s., rubens A. barbosa, released 
a statement calling for the restart of the ftaa negotiations. He said:
the ultimate goal of the process is not free trade for its own sake, but rather achieving the 
technological, economic, social, developmental, and political gains that we believe an ftaa 
can help generate.
these benefits will not emerge automatically, nor as an inevitable corollary of increased trade 
liberalization, but instead will require a balanced and equitable process of give and take39.
the most recent summit of the Americas to discuss the conclusion of an ftaa was held 
in Argentina in november 2005. At that summit, approximately 29 nations supported 
the conclusion of an ftaa; however, the five opposing nations constitute the bulk of Mer-
cosur and possess control of nearly half of all Latin American trade40. the latter group 
inserted language into the final agreement stating that the “conditions do not exist to 
attain a hemispheric free-trade accord that is balanced and fair with access to markets 
free of subsidies and distorted commercial practices”41. As a result, the talks broke down 
and President bush departed the summit before it concluded42.
the ftaa as proposed in santiago was dead. Yet the interest of the u.s. in securing 
trade agreements in the region was not. strong support for some type of agreement by 
Meetings are mandated to be held every two years. See, e.g., Ministerial Conferences, World trade Organi-
zation, available at www.wto.org.
37 see, e.g., colin McMaHon, Dissent Stalls Goals of Trade Talks: Bush Leaves Summit Without Agreement, cHi. 
trib., nov. 6, 2005.
38 see, e.g., reMy jurenas, Agriculture in the Free Trade Area of the Americas, congressional research service 
(June 15, 2004).
39 Press release, rubens a. barbosa, brazilian Amb, to the U.s., brazil and the United states: Overcoming 
Obstacles to an ftaa, available at http://www.brasilemb.org/embassy/embaixador_ftaa.shtml.
40 see, e.g., garry leecH, Despite ftaa Defeat at Americas Summit, Free Trade to be Imposed on Colombia, colombia 
Journal Online (nov. 7 2005).
41 see Id.; see also, Summit of the Americas Fails to Resurrect ftaa, 9 bridges Weekly trade news Digest 38 (nov. 
9, 2005).
42 see leecH.
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several Latin American countries led the u.s. to pursue bilateral ftas with willing Latin 
American countries instead. the u.s. was never averse to the use of bilateral ftas in the 
region43. In fact, former u.s. trade representative (ustr) robert zoellick stated at the 
Miami ministerial meeting, “America will not wait for the won’t-do countries [and will] 
move towards free trade with can-do countries”44.
colombia’s president, alvaro uribe, strongly supported President bush in his push for 
a regional fta.45 However, despite his political popularity, his position is not supported 
by a significant portion of the colombian population46. Despite the lack of domestic 
support, President uribe pursued a bilateral agreement with the u.s. A final agreement 
was signed on February 27, 2006.
the u.s. was intent on securing a trade agreement with Latin America in some form. 
the implementation of an ftaa in Latin America would allow the u.s. in effect to con-
solidate “its political and economic relevance in the world system”47. some authors have 
contended that the use of bilateral trade agreements in Latin America of late has been 
the result of a failure to secure a multilateral ftaa48. If this is the case, the u.s. may still 
be able to reach its goal of reasserting its power in the hemisphere using the incremental 
process of signing bilateral ftas49.
colombia’s primary trade partner outside of south America is the United states, 
accounting for approximately 40% of all export trade50. Accordingly, colombia has sig-
nificant interests to protect with regard to tariff and quota rates for colombian exports 
to the u.s. In addition, colombia does not have a highly diversified economy, resulting 
in part from their dependence on the u.s. as its primary trading partner, leaving few 
alternative markets offering sufficient demand51. However, colombia will only pursue 
a trade agreement with the u.s. if they can be assured of actual economic and political 
gains. the u.s. was ready to offer these benefits, “but only after [Latin American coun-
tries] were able to shape up their own economies and get them on the road to recovery 
43 see, e.g., carranza at 1054 (arguing that, at the Miami ministerial meeting, the U.s. stated its intent 
to pursue bilateral agreements with bolivia, colombia, the Dominican republic, Ecuador, Panama and 
Peru, along with the ftaa itself).
44 robert b. zoellick, America Will Not Wait for the Won’t-do Countries, fin. tiMes, sept. 22, 2003, at 23.
45 see, e.g., jane bussey, Trade negotiations are everywhere, but can they reach fruition?, For. Pol. (Jan. 1, 2005).
46 see, e.g., leecH (finding that 43% of colombians are opposed to an fta with the U.s. and 38% support 
such an agreement).
47 see agudelo, et al., at 10.
48 see, e.g., carranza at 1036 (“bilateral free trade agreements…such as the one signed with chile on 
June 6, 2003, would allow the United states to obtain concessions from individual countries without 
going through the cumbersome ftaa process”.)
49 the U.s. is also involved in the political sphere of Latin American relations. One of the stated rationa-
les for the U.s. to enter a bilateral fta with colombia is to combat drugs. See remarks by sec. rice and 
colombian Foreign Minister barco (April 27, 2005) (“we spoke about the free trade agreement [with 
colombia] and how important this is in its connection to combating drugs for colombia”.)
50 see colombia country report, Economist Intelligence Unit (2005); see also agudelo et al., at 12; 
gracia at 8.
51 agduelo et al., at 14.
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and steady growth”52. As a stable, democratic, middle-income country, colombia is a 
viable beneficiary.
IV. POLIcY AnALYsIs OF An fta bEtWEEn cOLOMbIA AnD tHE u.s.
Political decision-making in the domestic arena is often brought about by the efforts of 
lobbyists, active political representatives, community organizations and other members 
of civil society that have a vested interest in moving change forward. When addressing 
issues of foreign affairs, influential parties are expanded to include foreign governments, 
international organizations, and federal agencies with an interest in trade, security or 
diplomacy.
Accordingly, making substantial decisions in the context of foreign affairs, such as 
eliminating agricultural subsidies, invading a sovereign nation or joining the International 
criminal court, require vast amounts of political capital and negotiating. International 
trade is an area that can be approached either from a grandiose perspective, i.e., wto 
agreements, or from a smaller, more direct approach, i.e., bilateral trade agreements. 
the latter approach, which might be termed the incremental approach53, may be more 
effective in securing short-term benefits and maintaining sufficient political capital for 
a politician to stay in office. the broad, multilateral approach takes substantial politi-
cal capital in the form of multiple trade negotiations and time spent securing beneficial 
arrangements, and is unlikely to achieve major success in the short time a politician 
remains in office. the incremental approach offers some hope of economic gain at a 
lower political capital price tag.
the approach of incremental change was presented in 1963 by david braybrooke 
and cHarles e. lindbloM54. they suggest that while policymakers desire substantial 
change and the gathering of complete information about a proposed policy, they often 
accomplish neither and have to resort to a smaller, less informed way forward. Incremental 
decision-making “is decision-making through small or incremental moves on particular 
problems rather than through a comprehensive reform program”55.
braybrooke and lindbloM reject as naïve the synoptic model that tries to rationally 
order priorities in policymaking and argue that a welfare-function method that tries to 
identify the best possible solution to a problem is practically impossible, despite its de-
sirability56. Instead, the authors incorporate their model of “disjointed incrementalism” 
as a reflection of the existing and in fact the best possible method of problem-solving 
in the policymaking process.
52 HakiM at 124.
53 see david braybrooke and cHarles e. lindbloM, A strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a social 
Process 71 (the Free Pres of glencoe 1963). 
54 Id.
55 Id. at 71.
56 see K.E. boulding, Book Review: A Strategy of Decision, 29 Am. soc. rev. 930-931 (Dec. 1964).
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their approach to policymaking lowers the grand hopes and expectations of poli-
cymakers and encourages them to establish realistic, objective goals that can be accom-
plished despite not having complete information. Yet rather than abandoning larger goals, 
this approach suggests that they can be achieved through a series of coordinated steps:
to pursue incremental changes is to direct policy toward specific ills – the nature of which 
is continually being re-examined – rather than toward comprehensive reforms; it is also to 
pursue long-term changes through sequences of moves57.
the incremental approach avoids focusing on long-term stability or substantial goals 
and instead presents marginal gains as useful in moving toward greater goals while not 
immediately (if ever) achieving them58. For example, rather than incorporating equality 
into an income distribution model, the incrementalist would not generalize about the 
potential losses, knowing that values frequently shift at the margin, and instead would 
focus on avoiding “intolerable situations”59. recognizing that objectives, goals and values 
change as policies move forward, this approach sets smaller, more achievable short-term 
goals that allow for the long-term targets to remain flexible60.
Despite the drawbacks and criticisms of this theory61, it appears to be a reflection 
of the current u.s. policymaking approach to trade agreements. A comprehensive and 
informed approach to trade agreements would be to abide by general Agreement on 
tariffs and trade 1994 (gatt) Article 24, which restricts the entry by member states 
into bilateral ftas by requiring notification and sanctioning of any free trade agreement 
outside the purview of the wto. by discouraging ftas in favor of moving toward a mul-
tilateral trading system that is monitored and enforced by a neutral world body, the wto 
seeks to equitably balance the treatment of all member states and to protect develop-
ing countries from being taken advantage of through inequitable ftas. As of May 2003, 
265 regional trade agreements (rtas) were notified to the wto. Of these, only two have 
been approved under Article 24 and remain active62. this trend indicates an unwilling-
ness to pursue a comprehensive and informed approach, consistent with braybrooke 
and Lindblom’s assessment.
the u.s. has not abandoned its use of ftas in favor of encouraging the growth of a 
multilateral trading system largely because it is time-consuming and not cost-effective to 
57 see braybrooke and lindbloM at 74.
58 see Id. at 102-03.
59 Id. at 103.
60 Id. at 93-98.
61 see, e.g., bernard Hennessy, Book Review: A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process, 17 W. 
Pol. Q. no. 3, at 545-47 (sept. 1964) (arguing that this theory fails to add anything to the field of po-
litical science and is perhaps more of a philosophical examination of a well-known process).
62 see t.n. srinivasan, Regionalism and the World Trade Organization: Is Non-Discrimination Passé?, center Dis-
cussion Paper no. 767 at 4 (Dec. 1996), citing wto (1995) regionalism and the World trading system, 
geneva: World trade Organization; see also comments from julio lacarte at wto at 10 conference, 
new York (January 2006) (on file with author). 
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wait for the effective functioning of a multilateral system63. Achieving consensus among 
150 member states to implement such a comprehensive trading regime on tariffs, subsi-
dies, and other key trade areas, has resulted in a slow moving and often stalled process 
of multilateral negotiations. btas and rtas function as a shortcut to the achievement of 
freer trade.
Yet it is not only the speed of achieving consensus on a multilateral trade regime 
that has caused many countries to seek ftas outside the wto regime. At a recent wto 
conference, Mari elka Pangestu, Indonesia’s Minister of trade, said that while devel-
oping country trade ministers are well aware of the better terms of trade that they could 
achieve in a multilateral trading regime and while they know that ftas are almost always 
negative for developing countries, pressure from businesses in their own countries force 
them to conclude some type of agreement that provides at least limited benefits to their 
industries64. returning home without some type of trade agreement may reduce industry 
support for the ruling party.
the result of a desire to move forward, even if only in small steps, and the recognition 
that, while a better system may exist, more immediate results are better for maintaining 
political capital, is a process of disjointed incrementalism. In the context of international 
trade, an area to which braybrooke and lindbloM may not have predicted the application 
of their theory, the benefits and drawbacks of an incremental approach applied through 
ftas between developed and developing countries may offer short-term political capital, 
but may also develop substantially inequitable economic conditions and thus long-term 
political disaster, at least for the developing country party.
V. bEnEFIts OF tHE trADE AgrEEMEnt
the atPa provided colombia with duty-free access to the vast majority (approximately 
80%) of colombian goods coming into the u.s.65. the atPa benefits were set to expire 
at the end of 2006. Under the newly negotiated bilateral agreement, most of these trade 
preferences are made permanent. the primary exception to the agreement is the export 
of colombian sugar, which will still face tariffs and quota restrictions in the u.s. “Any 
exports [of sugar] beyond the trQ would face prohibitively high tariffs”66.
colombia will open its previously closed market to the import of u.s. remanufac-
tured goods, including machinery, computers and cellular phones67. colombia will also 
63 see comments of tiMotHy Punke, Preston gates ellis llP, at the American bar Association section 
of International Law Annual Meeting, chicago, April 2006 (on file with author).
64 see comments of Mari elka Pangestu, Minister of trade, republic of Indonesia, at the wto at 10: 
governance, Dispute settlement and Developing countries conference, new York, April 5-7, 2006 (on 
file with author).
65 see, e.g., “U.s. Announces completion of Free-trade Agreement with colombia”, U.s. Dept. of state 
(February 27, 2006).
66 Id.
67 Id.
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provide immediate duty-free treatment to u.s. farm exports, including beef, pork, corn, 
poultry, rice, fruits, vegetables, processed foods and dairy products68. Further, colombia 
will provide immediate duty-free treatment to u.s. textiles, presuming that they meet 
the rules of origin under the agreement, although an escape clause was added to protect 
colombian producers in the event that domestic colombian producers are harmed by 
excessive imports69.
In the services sector, colombia plans to offer more opportunities for market access, 
to the u.s. service industry including the dismantling of investment barriers as well as 
removal of the requirement that a branch be established in colombia before services are 
provided70. these benefits particularly go to the u.s. construction, energy and profes-
sional services industries71. In addition, telecommunication networks in colombia are 
to be exposed to broader market openness through the removal of the ability of local 
firms to claim “first right” to the telecom networks72.
u.s. investors in colombia will have an opportunity to operate in a more stable legal 
framework under the agreement. All types of investments are protected under the agree-
ment, including enterprise, debt, concessions and intellectual property73. For the most 
part, u.s. investors will be treated as if they were colombian investors, with the ability 
to establish, acquire and operate investments throughout the country74. they will also 
be provided with due process protections and remedies in the event of legal claims such 
as expropriation by the state75.
For intellectual property protections, u.s. companies will be treated equally with 
colombian companies. colombia agreed to develop an online trademark registration 
system, to extend the terms of copyright protections, to limit the grounds for revoking 
a patent and to create a system for preventing the marketing of pharmaceutical products 
that infringe patents76. colombia is also required to ensure the use by the government 
of only legitimate computer software and to criminalize end-user piracy (such as with 
the illegal downloading of music)77.
colombian laws and regulations will be posted on the Internet under the agreement, 
providing procedural certainty and transparency. Laws will also be established to prohibit 
anti-competitive business conduct, enforce domestic labor laws, enforce environmental 
laws and to establish dispute settlement panels that promote compliance through trade-
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
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enhancing remedies78. Finally, the agreement includes “innovative provisions that allow 
the creation of working groups to evaluate the impacts of the agreement on small and 
medium-sized businesses”79.
VI. DrAWbAcKs OF tHE trADE AgrEEMEnt
Agriculture
One of the primary Latin American objections to the ftaa was the refusal of the u.s. 
to negotiate its position on agricultural subsidies. the importance of this issue to the 
region cannot be overstated; however, the importance of this issue to each individual 
country in Latin America resonates unequally80. the u.s.-colombia fta did not address 
u.s. agricultural subsidies, nor did it seem likely to address them in other bilateral ftas81.
the agreement is highly favorable to certain u.s. agricultural industries, including 
the beef, cotton, and wheat industries. these agricultural sectors will largely receive 
immediate duty-free access to the colombian market82. According to negotiators, ag-
ricultural issues were the reason for the delayed conclusion of an agreement83. strong 
opposition from most sectors of the colombian agriculture industry was unsuccessful 
in slowing or preventing the progress of the agreement84.
rice, sugar and poultry are three of the most sensitive agricultural products to the 
colombian economy. colombian negotiators sought to receive expanded duty-free access 
to the u.s. market for sugar in the range of 500,000 to one million additional tons per 
year. u.s. negotiators sought to protect the interests of the u.s. domestic sugar industry, 
which argued that colombian access to the u.s. sugar market would triple in the first 
year, negatively impacting the u.s. sugar industry85. the resulting agreement provided 
additional access to only 50,000 tons of colombian sugar (for a total of 75,000 tons per 
year)86. the quota on sugar will increase by 750 tons per year; however, the over-quota 
tariff is the only tariff in the fta that will never be phased out.
the u.s. was interested in expanding access for domestic producers to the colombian 
rice market, which had previously been highly restrictive. the result was an increased 
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 For example, the colombian agricultural sector is 12.5% of its economy, whereas in brazil agriculture 
accounts for 10.1% of its total economy, and in Venezuela, it accounts for 4.9% of the total economy. 
see Economist Intelligence Unit Economic Indicators: colombia (2005). 
81 see, e.g., jenalia Moreno, ftaa Trade Meeting: U.S. Adds 6 Players to Lean on Brazil; S. American Giant Puts Up 
Resistance, Hous. chron., nov. 19, 2003, at 1b, 10b (suggesting that the u.s. refusal to address subsidies 
in the ftaa context signals an unwillingness to negotiate in the bilateral context as well).
82 see, trade Facts.
83 see, e.g., U.S., Colombia Sign Bilateral fta, 10 bridges Weekly trade news Digest 7 (March 1, 2006).
84 see Id. (noting, however, that the colombian flower industry is expected to benefit from this fta).
85 see, Completed Colombia fta Would Triple Sugar Access in the First Year, Inside u.s. trade (March 3, 2006).
86 see, e.g., doug PalMer, u.s., Colombia Reach Free Trade Deal, Wash. Post , Feb. 27, 2006.
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quota of 79,000 tons and tariff elimination phased in over 19 years87. this was a sig-
nificant improvement over past treatment and was hailed by the u.s. rice industry as a 
success over colombian opposition88.
colombia agreed to open its market to u.s. exports of chicken leg quarters, despite 
strong opposition by colombian poultry farmers89. the market will permit an initial 
quota of 26,000 tons to be imported and will phase-out all quotas within 18 years90. A 
representative from a colombian poultry trade association argued that this provision 
could wipe out the colombian poultry industry “in a couple of years”91.
Dispute Settlement
A mechanism for exporters to remedy certain trade disputes between countries is an 
invaluable facet of an effective trade agreement92. the u.s.-colombia fta includes a 
dispute settlement mechanism that allows for monetary remedies to force compliance 
with respect to the core obligations of the agreement93.
Article 24 of the gatt agreement discourages member states from entering into bi-
lateral ftas. One of the rationales for this article is that weaker countries in trade agree-
ments should be protected through legitimate and fair dispute settlement mechanisms. 
Disputes that arise out of a trade agreement are likely to be resolved in favor of the 
dominant party to the agreement without such protections. Article 24 urges the use of 
a multilateral approach, allowing weaker countries to effect more equitable and enforce-
able settlements, as opposed to a bilateral scheme where the dominant country may be 
in a better position to benefit from trade imbalances.
In the case of the u.s.-colombia fta, the dispute settlement mechanism has not yet 
been utilized; however, as it was negotiated outside the multilateral framework between 
a dominant state and subordinate state, there is a possibility that inequitable trade prac-
tices will not be effectively resolved in favor of colombia in some instances.
Economic Growth & the Informal Sector
After the conclusion of the nafta agreement between the u.s., Mexico and canada, 
Mexico encountered substantial economic problems. these included a reduction in 
manufacturing sector employment, a 10% average drop in industrial worker wages, and 
87 see Id.
88 see forrest laws, Colombia fta Could Help Sell More u.s. Rice Western Farm Press, Mar. 17, 2006 (discussing 
the comments of the usa rice Federation toward to the newly concluded agreement).
89 see, e.g., Colombia Seals Trade Deal with us, bbc news, Feb. 27, 2006.
90 see PalMer.
91 see PalMer.
92 see, e.g., HakiM at 132 (suggesting that a dispute settlement system would be among the most important 
benefits to a Latin American country entering a trade agreement with the u.s.).
93 see trade Facts at 7.
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a growth spurt in the informal economy94. During the 1990s, a similar expansion of 
income inequality was seen in colombia, largely due to an imbalance across economic 
sectors and an increase in wage premiums95.
Peter Hakim, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, argues that the benefits of 
free trade for Latin America depend on three factors, each of which varies based on the 
country: 1) amount of exports shipped to the u.s.; 2) level of import barriers in the u.s. 
faced by the particular country, and; 3) contribution of exports to the country’s economy96.
colombian exports to the u.s. are 46% of total exports ($8.8 billion), and u.s. ex-
ports to colombia are 22% of colombian imports ($5.4 billion)97. total colombian 
exports in 2005 accounted for $18.8 billion out of an annual gdP that year of $118.1 
billion98. As a result of an fta with the u.s., colombia’s exports to the u.s. are expected 
to increase by roughly 4% or $600 million99. the resulting increase, while significant, is 
far less than the economic gains made by the Asian tigers, which export closer to 40% 
of their total gdP100.
One of the major concerns left unaddressed in trade negotiations is the impact of 
export-led trade development in the informal, or extralegal sector of a developing country. 
consider, for a moment, a small business owner in the u.s. that makes a living knitting 
sweaters and selling them at flea markets in rural Pennsylvania. the impact of a u.s. 
trade agreement with any other country on this business owner, if they are aware of the 
agreement, will be either zero (because they are not an exporter of goods) or negative 
(because they face increased foreign competition from less expensive imported sweaters).
the small business owner in our example is usually unregulated and operating on a 
self-proprietary basis. they may or may not have a license, but likely do not participate 
in the formal economy that an orthodox store owner would. these businesses exist in 
the u.s., but on a comparatively small scale101. In many developing countries, these in-
formal economies constitute as much as 80% of the total economy102. the World bank 
estimates that colombia’s informal economy is 39.1% of total gdP103.
returning briefly to our example, if the u.s. sweater manufacturer became aware of 
the new trade agreement and was interested in selling their wares to the country with 
which the agreement was signed, the process for acquiring a business and export license 
 
94 see, guy Poitras, Inventing north America: canada, Mexico, and the United states, 125 (2001).
95 see gracia at 6.
96 HakiM at 126-128.
97 see Background Note: Colombia, u.s. Dept. of state, bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (Feb. 2006) 
(explaining that colombian exports to the u.s. totaled us$8.8 billion in 2005).
98 see Id.
99 see HakiM at 128.
100 Id. 128.
101 the World bank estimates the u.s. informal economic sector to be 8.8%. see, World bank, Doing bu-
siness (2003).
102 see Hernando de soto, the Other Path: the Economic Answer to terrorism xvi (basic books 1989).
103 World bank, Doing business (2003)
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would be easier, faster and less expensive than is the case in most developing countries. 
the World bank estimates that it would take about five days, with an average of five steps 
and would cost 0.5% of annual per capita gdP to start a formal business in the u.s.104. 
In colombia, the same manufacturer would go through twelve steps, taking roughly 43 
days and costing 25.3% of annual income.
Acquiring the licenses to operate and complying with permit requirements for our 
u.s. manufacturer would take about 70 days and cost 16.9% of income per capita. the 
same business in colombia would require 150 days and cost 697.3% of income per 
capita to comply105. Finally, the time it takes to export goods once the business has been 
legally registered and licensed, is nine days in the u.s. and 34 in colombia106. thus, 
while the u.s. sweater manufacturer may survive the wait and could potentially benefit 
from the agreement, a typical colombian exporter may face significant challenges in 
getting their goods to foreign markets and thus would be less likely to benefit from the 
agreement.
tAbLE 1: cOMPArIsOn OF tHE tIME tO bEgIn An ExPOrt OPErAtIOn In tHE U.s. AnD cOLOMbIA
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Data from World bank, Doing business (2003).
104 Id.
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tAbLE 2: cOMPArIsOn OF cOsts tO bEgIn An ExPOrt OPErAtIOn In tHE u.s. AnD cOLOMbIA
Costs of Starting an Export Business
$45,000
$40,000
$35,000
$30,000
$25,000
$20,000
$15,000
$10,000
$5,000
$0
United statescolombia
Per capita Income
costs to start a business
costs for Licenses & Permits
Data from World bank, Doing business (2003).
the distinction between the benefits accruing to an informal economic businessperson 
in the u.s. and that same businessperson in colombia are stark. Yet more importantly, 
the scope of this impact is much greater in colombia with almost half of their entire 
economy unable to easily and affordably benefit from the fta. Accordingly, the impact 
on economic growth must be analyzed very differently based upon the parties to the 
agreement.
Inequitable trade results when economic benefits from trade accrue to one segment 
of society and either have no effect or a negative effect on other segments of society. 
When a segment of society is excluded from the export economy due to an inability to 
operate their business legally, any export-driven benefits acquired through an fta will 
accrue disproportionately to the population. the income gap among the colombian 
population may grow because of this fta as a result of increased export benefits for co-
lombia’s legal exporters combined with the negative impact of increased competition 
from u.s. imports on extralegal businesses throughout colombia.
VII. Conclusions and Recommendations
colombia and other south American countries have an alternative to forming either an 
ftaa or entering potentially detrimental bilateral agreements with other countries. A 
unification of Mercosur with the Andean community would create a significant force 
in the Western hemisphere and in the world and may serve as an adequate substitute for 
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the conclusion of an ftaa107. A regional approach to liberalized Latin American trade 
has the advantage of unifying related markets, each of which shares the goals of poverty 
reduction and equitable economic growth. recent events in the region may make such 
regional unification difficult from a political standpoint, but it is in the best economic 
interests of each country to pursue a single approach to foreign trade for the region.
the effect of an fta on colombian economic growth is uncertain. According to an 
economic study conducted by Hernando zuleta and oscar gracia, “the effect of an 
fta [on colombia] alone is likely to be relatively small”108. by and large, developing 
countries are importers of goods; accordingly, an fta that lowers import barriers for a 
developed and a developing country has more positive economic impact on the devel-
oped country109. the impact of a bilateral trade agreement on colombia may be less 
significant than ftas in other parts of the world110.
As a growing middle-income economy, colombia is approaching the road to economic 
independence and should tread carefully to avoid succumbing to a deeper dependency 
relationship with the u.s. trade offers many developing countries opportunities to pursue 
economic growth strategies. However, it is not in the opening of markets where these 
opportunities lie. rather, trade offers an opportunity to examine domestic policies on 
imports and exports, manufacturing, technological growth, as well as to evaluate rule of 
law protections for domestic producers and foreign investors, regulatory flexibility for 
licensing and innovation, and investment in domestic education and health programs111.
the short-term gain policy approach to trade agreements applied by the u.s. may 
serve short-term interests and appease certain business communities in both the u.s. and 
the partner country. However, this incremental approach suffers from a lack of foresight 
and ignores a deeper discussion about development and equitable trade, without which 
the global trading system will be less predictable, accountable and successful.
critics have suggested that the incremental decision-making approach was part of 
the reason for the failed u.s. policy in Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s112. Had a 
more comprehensive strategy been applied at the outset, significant lives may have been 
saved. Using this incremental approach to secure an fta with colombia may similarly 
107 see, e.g., carranza at 1052.
108 orlando gracia and Hernando zuleta, The Free Trade Agreement Between Colombia and the usa: What Can 
Happen to Colombia?, Working Paper (2004), available at http://www.webpondo.org/filesoctdic2004/fta.
pdf.
109 victor Mosoti, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Possibility of a Multilateral Framework on Investment at the wto: 
Are Poor Economies Caught in Between? 26 nw J. Int’l & bus. 95, 96-99 (Fall 2005).
110 see agudelo at 21 (inferring that globalization and trade agreements in general have less impact in 
Latin America than they do in other parts of the world).
111 see, e.g., Peter HakiM, Western Hemisphere Free trade: Why should Latin America be Interested?, 
526 Annals, 121 (March 1993) (suggesting that the economic and political restructuring resulting from 
free trade agreements is where the real economic benefits come from).
112 see, e.g., c. boyden gray, The War in Kosovo: Failed Lessons of Incrementalism, 34 Loy. L. r. 5, 6 (nov. 2000) 
(finding that the use of incrementalism delayed the effective application of force in Vietnam through 
the use of the reserves at the outset of the war).
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blind policymakers to the most salient trade issues in the region – namely, equitable 
economic growth policy, development assistance, and growth of social capital. the im-
balanced trade resulting from this and similar ftas further solidifies the inferior position 
of developing countries in the global marketplace.
